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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of public subsidies on private sector research and 
development (R&D) activity for East German ﬁ  rms. Using propensity score matching, 
our empirical results indicate that subsidized ﬁ  rms indeed show a higher level of R&D 
intensity and a higher probability for patent application compared to non-subsidized 
ﬁ  rms for our sample year 2003. On average we ﬁ  nd an increase in the R&D intensity 
of about 3.7 percentage points relative to non-subsidized ﬁ  rms. The probability for 
patent applications rises by 21 percentage points. These results closely match earlier 
empirical results for East Germany. Given the fact that the East German innovation 
system is particularly driven by small and medium sized enterprises (SME), we put a 
special focus on the eﬀ  ectiveness of the R&D subsidies for this latter subgroup. Here 
no previous empirical evidence is available so far. Our ﬁ  ndings indicate that policy 
eﬀ  ectiveness also holds for private R&D activity of SMEs, where the highest increase 
in terms of R&D intensity is estimated for micro businesses with up to 10 employees.
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Two decades after German re-uniﬁcation the East German economy still faces several
challenges on its convergence path towards the economic structures of its Western coun-
terpart. Although the regional economy and especially its manufacturing sector have made
considerable progress throughout the last two decades, the economy still shows some dis-
tinct structural weaknesses such as a by far lower innovation activity compared to the
Western average (see e.g. Guenther et al., 2010, and Alecke et al., 2010). That is, expen-
ditures on R&D by the private sector were about half as high in East Germany compared
to West Germany in 2006 (BERD of 1% compared to 1.9% as a share of regional GDP)
and similar also for patent applications per capita (70% of the Western average). The
importance of the region’s absorptive capacity in building up stocks of knowledge and
R&D as key determinants of the region’s technology level and subsequently long-run eco-
nomic development has recently been stressed by the ’new’ growth theory (see e.g. Barro
& Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
Consequently, there have been several political attempts for East Germany to foster
income growth and convergence, which also increasingly accounted for the role played by
knowledge creation through R&D. As a result, about 60% of all innovating ﬁrms in East
Germany received public fundings troughout the mid-1990s compared to only 10% o in
West Germany (see Ebling et al., 1999). This dependency has not been reduced much
throughout the last years (see e.g. Rammer & Czarnitzki, 2003, as well as Czarnitzki
& Licht, 2006). It is thus a matter of primary interest from the policy perspective, to
look more carefully at the eﬀectiveness of these spending schemes given their rather large
absolute volumes (roughly 1.1 billion spent per year).
What makes East Germany a particularly interesting case study, is its regional inno-
vation system, which is dominated by small and medium-sized ﬁrms. Compared to West
Germany, the share of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) engaged in continuous
R&D activity is far higher (36% of all SME relative to 9%). The same holds for the share
of R&D employment in total employment for ﬁrms up to 50 employees (see Guenther et
al., 2010). As earlier work has shown, the regional knowledge production function trans-
forming knowledge and R&D inputs into innovative outputs may substantially diﬀer from
innovation systems driven by large innovative ﬁrms (see e.g. Conte & Vivarelli, 2005). This
naturally points to the question in how far the publically ﬁnanced R&D factor inputs can
be absorbed by SMEs so that public policies eﬀectively foster private R&D activity rather
than crowding-out private spendings.
One the hand one may argue that SMEs are highly aﬀected by barriers to innovation
such as ﬁnancial bottlenecks, shortage and hindered access to qualiﬁed personnal as well
4as limited internal and missing market know-how, which negatively aﬀects their innovative
performance. This may particularly be true for SMEs in pheripherical regions such as East
Germany (see e.g. McAdam et al., 2006). On the other hand, SMEs are likely to be more
ﬂexible and may easily adjust their knowledge production function to changes in changes
of the surrounding innovation system. With respect to R&D grants this could imply that
SMEs are not able to increase their innovation process over a certain maximum, so that
with an increase in the level of subsidy also increased crowing-out eﬀects can be observed.
However, at the same time R&D grants may also signiﬁcantly contribute to overcome
barriers to innovation for SME in East Germany. Thus, from a theoretical point of view
there are both arguments advoacting as well as challenging the eﬀectiveness of R&D
subsidies. In the following, we put special emphasis on answering the latter point using
a large ﬁrm level dataset for East German regions and applying propensity score based
matching estimation.
Compared to the huge international evidence on R&D policy eﬀects, there are rather
few empirical references for the East German case.1 Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) as well
as Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) report that public R&D support has a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on private sector R&D intensity. Both studies report an increase in the innovation
activity of East German ﬁrms receiving public funding of about 4 percentage points
relative to the non-subsidized comparison group. Additionally, Czarnitzki and Licht (2006)
analyse the marginal eﬀects of R&D subsidies on patent activity, which is estimated to be
about 22%. For both the R&D intensity as well as patent activity, the latter authors also
identify a higher eﬀect in East Germany compared to the Western states throughout the
period 1994 to 2000. However, no empirical evidence is given for the important subgroup
of SMEs in the regional innovation system of East Germany. This papers aims to ﬁll this
gap in the empirical literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we brieﬂy
introduce the micro dataset used for the empirical exercise. Section 3 then sketches the
Kernel matching approach and discusses the empirical results for the full sample as well
as three subsamples for small ﬁrms. Section 4 reports the results for robustness checks
based on a variety of alternative matching algorithms as well as a sample restriction to
only those ﬁrms, who permanently perform R&D. Section 5 concludes.
1Literature surveys summarizing the eﬀects found at the international levels are for instance given by David et al. (2000),
Hall & van Reenen (2000), as well as Garcia-Quevedo (2004). On average public subsidies are found to exert a positive
eﬀect on diﬀerent private sector outcome variables such as R&D expenditures and R&D employment (as factor inputs) as
well as innovation activity and patent application (as output indicator in the process of knowledge creation).
52 Data and Variable Deﬁnition
We assess the impact of direct R&D support measures using micro data based on the
GEFRA Business survey (GEFRA et al., 2004 and 2005). This survey was conducted
in the evaluation process of two direct enterprise support schemes, namely the ”Joint
Task for the Promotion of Industry and Trade” and the ”Promotion of Joint Research
Projects” on behalf of the Thuringian Ministry of Economics and the Thuringian Ministry
of Science, Research and Arts. For the survey a total of 6.861 ﬁrms in the manufacturing
and production-oriented service sector have been contacted. The return rate was about
21%, so the survey contains a total of 1.484 ﬁrms of which 284 ﬁrms received public
R&D grants. The questionnaire refers to ﬁrm-speciﬁc data for the year 2003. Since earlier
evidence on the eﬀectiveness of R&D policies in East Germany was exclusively based on
data from the Mannheimer Innovation Panel (MIP), our results may serve as the ﬁrst
cross-check for the robustness of these results.2
The questionnaire was designed to incorporate data on various factor inputs (labour,
intermediate inputs, human and physical capital) as well as economic outcome variables
such as sales, exports and labour productivity. With respect to variables representing
R&D activity at the ﬁrm level the dataset includes a binary dummy variable for general
patenting activity and the ﬁrm’s R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales.
Firms were asked whether they received funding by any R&D support programmes of
the federal government, the federal states or the European Union. Since all possible R&D
programmes launched by public authorities are covered by the survey, this study is not
restricted to a particular policy measure, but reﬂects the joined eﬀect of the available set
of public R&D policies. Many studies deal with only one speciﬁc public R&D program and
cannot control for possible eﬀects of other sources of public R&D funding (for a discussion
see e.g. Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003). In contrast, our approach is able to construct a
treatment group consisting of those ﬁrms that received subsidies at the regional, national
or EU level.
A large set of ﬁrm speciﬁc control variables is necessary to appropriately isolate the
causal eﬀect of R&D subsidies. Basic variables are ﬁrm size in terms of total employment
and ﬁrm age. We further use capital-intensity, deﬁned as tangible assets per employee, to
control for the technology used in the production process and also test for the eﬀect of
the investment intensity, deﬁned as total investments per sales. The skill structure of a
ﬁrm’s workforce is used as a determinant of research activity and the ability to attract
2For details on the MIP see e.g. Janz et al. (2001).
6public funding in a signiﬁcant way (see Kaiser, 2004). We thus include the share of highly
educated employees, i.e. those who hold a university degree (including universities of
applied sciences). To account for the role of ﬁrm competitiveness we include the export
ratio in our model.
Additionally, we use binary dummy variables to indicate the ﬁrm’s legal form and the
aﬃliation to a parent company either in West, East Germany or abroad respectively. We
also take into account whether a ﬁrm is performing research on a regular basis and/or
is running an own R&D department.3 This latter variable should reﬂect the absorptive
capacity and R&D experience for a speciﬁc ﬁrm. A detailed list of variables covered in
this analysis together with their descriptive statistics is given in Table 1 and Table 2.
Before applying the data for empirical analysis, we tested for sample representativeness,
see Appendix A.
3 Matching Estimation
In order to identify the causal impact of public subsidies on private sector R&D activity we
apply nonparametric matching, which is by now a common approach for microeconometric
programme evaluation (see e.g. Heckman et al., 1997). The approach is nonparametric in
nature and compares the sample average of outcome variables for ﬁrms that exhibit a
treatment with those ﬁrms that are similar in terms of a predeﬁned set of variables, but
are not subject to the treatment. Our estimation strategy rests on a two-stage process,
which estimates a probit model for the receipt of programme participation in a ﬁrst step,
and then uses the obtained propensity score in order to control for further determinants
of private R&D activity beside the public subsidies, when comparing the means of treated
and comparison ﬁrms in a second step.
It is worth noting, that the matching approach rests on two crucial assumptions. First,
we assume that for individuals (ﬁrms) with identical characteristics our outcome measure
(R&D intensity, patent applications) is independent from the treatment. This conditional
independence assumption (CIA) is expected to be fulﬁlled if all variables inﬂuencing the
outcome are at our disposal. Although the CIA cannot be tested, our sample contains a
rich set of ﬁrm-level information which is likely to make the CIA being fulﬁlled. A second
3Concerning the question of the frequency of R&D being conducted, the GEFRA Business Survey asks whether a ﬁrm is
either ’regularly’, ’sporadically’ or ’not at all’ engaged in own R&D activities. When using this variable for propensity score
estimation there is of course the potential risk of endogeneity, since the decision to apply for R&D subsidies may depend on
the frequency of R&D activities. However, here we assume that the impact of a subsidy is not that big that a ﬁrm would
actually change its structural behavior. This is even more reasonable for the case of an R&D department. We thus take the
latter variable as default proxy for regular R&D activity at the ﬁrm level.
7Table 1: Variable deﬁnition
Variable Description
R&D activity
Patent activity =1 if ﬁrm has applied for patent registration during
the years 2001 to 2003
R&Di n t e n s i t y R&D intensity deﬁned as R&D expenditures
relative to total turnover (net of intermediate
inputs) in 2003
Treatment variable
R&D subsidies =1 if ﬁrm received subsidies either from the federal
state Thuringia, national or EU wide programmes
or combinations; 0 otherwise
Standard ﬁrm speciﬁc control variables and skill structure
Size Firm size in terms of total employment
Age Number of years since ﬁrm was created, relative to
2004
Capital Capital intensity deﬁned as total capital stock per
employees
Investment Investment intensity deﬁned as total investment per
sales in 2003
Human capital high Share of high skilled employees as share of total
employment
Human capital low Share of low skilled employees as share of total
employment
Internationalization and regional input-output relations
Regional sales Sales within the core region (30km) relative to total
sales, in %
East German sales Sales within East Germany relative to total sales,
in %
West German sales Sales within West Germany relative to total sales,
in %
Exports Export share in percent, deﬁned as total exports
relative to sales, in %
Regional inputs Input from suppliers within the core region (30km)
relative to total inputs, in %
East German inputs Input from suppliers from East Germany relative to
total inputs, in %
West German inputs Input from suppliers from West Germany relative
to total inputs, in %
Imports Import share deﬁned as imports relative to total
inputs, in %
Binary dummy variables
Liability =1 if ﬁrm owner has full legal liability, 0 for limited
liability
West German ownership =1 if ﬁrm belongs to a parent company in West
Germany
East German ownership =1 if ﬁrm belongs to a parent company in East
Germany
Foreign ownership =1 if ﬁrm belongs to a parent company abroad
Small =1 if ﬁrm has less than ﬁve employees
R&D department =1 if ﬁrm has R&D employees within a ﬁxed R&D
department
8Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Patent activity 1412 0.141 0.348 0 1
R&DI n t e n s i t y 1265 0.047 0.24 0 6.6
R&D subsidies 1267 0.223 0.417 0 1
Size 1431 56.67 148.03 1 2947
Age 1279 11.07 7.79 1 73
Capital 1238 70.97 178.26 0 3875
Investment 986 32.05 364.80 0 10831
Human capital high 1385 0.19 0.24 0 1
Human capital low 1431 0.07 0.39 0 13.79
Regional sales 1382 23.64 30.69 0 100
East German sales 1387 11.50 16.89 0 100
West German sales 1391 39.45 31.50 0 100
Exports 1365 12.70 22.21 0 100
Regional inputs 1261 23.42 28.79 0 100
East German inputs 1265 11.83 17.14 0 100
West German inputs 1269 39.76 29.68 0 100
Imports 1242 9.82 18.66 0 100
Liability 1426 0.275 0.447 0 1
West German ownership 1164 0.140 0.347 0 1
East German ownership 1164 0.043 0.203 0 1
Foreign ownership 1164 0.049 0.218 0 1
R&D department 1362 0.277 0.448 0 1
assumption that has to be fulﬁlled is the so called stable unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA). This assumption states that individual causal eﬀects may not be inﬂuenced by
the participation status of other ﬁrms (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996). In the latter
case we rely on the argument raised by Almus & Czarnitzki (2003) that the presence of
such distorting eﬀects, which may alter the relative price for R&D factor inputs, is not
very likely for East Germany. The main reason is that the pricing mechanisms for R&D
factor inputs are assumed to be driven by national and international rather than regional
factors. R&D input prices should largely be determined by market forces and rather be
independent from policy distortions such as R&D subsidies to the East German economy.
Building on these assumptions a general matching model to measure the eﬀect of the











where N is the total number of treated ﬁrms i, Y1 and Y0 denote outcome values for
treated and comparison ﬁrms j. Then, the match of each treated ﬁrm is constructed as a
weighted average over the outcomes of non-treated, where the weights W(i,j) depend on
9the ’distance’ between i and j.
For empirical application a decision about the matching routine has to be made. There
are several types of matching criteria available, which diﬀer by the speciﬁc weighting
function W(i,j) used. Most criteria match treated ﬁrms only with a certain fraction of the
comparison group, where selection is based on the obtained propensity score from the ﬁrst-
step probit model. Prominent examples are nearest-, k-nearest neighbor and stratiﬁcation
matching. Other routines like Kernel and Mahalanobis matching use a weighted matching
approach based on averaging procedures of the outcomes for all comparison units. As
Caliendo & Kopeinig (2005) point out, one major advantage of these latter approaches is
the lower variance, which is achieved because more information is used. In the following
we use the Kernel matching algorithm, which was introduced by Heckman et al. (1997),
as default weighting function since it has also shown to have good ﬁnite sample properties
e.g. compared to the standard k-nearest neighbor matching function (see Fr¨ ohlich, 2004).4




k∈C K[(Pk(X) − Pi(X))/h]
, (2)
where K is the Kernel function and h is the bandwidth parameter to be chosen.5 P(X)
denotes the propensity score for variable vector X. Since we are dealing with rather small
numbers of observations we compute bootstrapped standard errors.6 We also apply a
common support restriction to our Kernel matching routine in order to minimize the risk
of bad matches.7
Table 3 shows the results of the ﬁrst-step probit estimation. We report marginal ef-
fects for diﬀerent model speciﬁcations: In model I (’full’) a fairly general speciﬁcation is
estimated. The regression results in table 3 show that only few variables turn out to be
signiﬁcant, while the loss of observations due to missing values is large. In model II we
therefore try to reduce the number of variables used in a stepwise regression approach,
that starts from a slim model only containing industry dummies and subsequently adds
4For estimation we use software codes for Stata by Becker & Ichino (2002) as well as Leuven & Sianesi (2003).
5We use the Epanechnikow kernel as default and apply diﬀerent values for the bandwidth, which are commonly proposed
in the literature (see e.g. Jones et al., 1996).
6We applied both bootstrapping for just the second step of the matching estimator as well as simultaneously bootstrap-
ping for both steps including the ﬁrst-step probit estimation. We set the number of bootstrap replications equal to 500.
Compared to the results with standard errors based on asymptotically normal statistical inference the bootstrapped SE are
somewhat more restrictive and may thus be seen as the more conservative benchmark in evaluating programme eﬀectiveness.
For a discussion of bootstrapping standard errors for matching estimators see e.g. Caliendo & Kopeinig (2005).
7The underlying idea is that the matching procedure is restricted to those treated observations for which also ﬁrms in
the comparison group are found with similar values for the propensity score, while treated units whose propensity score
value is larger than the largest value in the non-treated pool are left unmatched (for details see e.g. Lechner, 2000).
10further variables that are found to be signiﬁcant at the 10% signiﬁcance level. As table
3 shows ﬁltering by statistical signiﬁcance already leads to a considerable reduction in
model size. However, since we allow for a large set of candidate variables, model II still
drops many observations.
We thus take model II as the starting point to take out those variables, which show
a large number of missings and have been excluded from model II based on statistical
signiﬁcance tests. We nevertheless keep those variables in the candidate set that were
tested insigniﬁcant in model II but do not restrict the overall sample size. We then take
this reduced set of candidate variables and perform a further stepwise regression. The
resulting model speciﬁcation III employs a much higher number of observations. Most
variables the were already found to be signiﬁcant in model II are also selected for model
III. Moreover, some variables like ﬁrm size and the share of sales to West Germany even
turn out signiﬁcant now.
As the results for model III additionally show, the McFadden R2 is only slightly reduced
compared to the full model and even higher than the ﬁrst stepwise regression result.
Moreover, testing for model III being nested in I is clearly rejected. Given the large
increase in the numbers of observation versus the rather small loss in terms of model ﬁt,
we choose model III as empirical basis for our propensity score calculation. This point
was also raised by Augurzky & Schmidt (2001), arguing that the discard of many sample
observations may lead to a non-representative matched sample. The obtained ﬁtted values
can then be used as weights in order to match pairs of treated and comparison ﬁrms.
According to table 3, the probability to receive an R&D subsidy is thus most import-
antly driven by the skill composition of the ﬁrm’s employees as well as the presence of an
own R&D department. For both variables we get signiﬁcant and positive marginal eﬀects.
The same holds for ﬁrm size, while ﬁrm’s age has a signiﬁcantly positive inﬂuence on the
probability to receive subsidies. That is, the younger a ﬁrm is, the lower is its probabi-
lity to receive a subsidy. Finally, regarding regional input-output linkages, a high share
of regional sales as well as sales to West German has a negative impact on programme
participation. Though being tested signiﬁcant in model speciﬁcations I and II, the dum-
my for West German ownership turns out insigniﬁcant in our ﬁnal speciﬁcation and was
dropped.
As a ﬁrst check for the appropriateness of the propensity score method we then per-
form a mean comparison for our explanatory variables. This allows us to see whether
the obtained propensity score is successful in terms of balancing diﬀerences for the set of
covariates. The results are shown in table 4. They indicate that in general the null hypo-
thesis of identical means for treated and non-treated has to be rejected for the unmatched
11Table 3: Probit estimation for receiving R&D subsidies
Dep. Var.: I II III
R&D subsidies Full Stepwise Stepwise
log(Size) 0.024 0.064∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.024)








Human capital high 0.562∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.112) (0.059)
Human capital low -0.257 -0.307∗
(0.176) (0.174)
Regional sales -0.003∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0005)
East German sales -0.001
(0.001)






East German inputs 0.003∗
(0.001)






West German ownership -0.106∗∗ -0.108∗∗
(0.039) (0.039)




R&D department 0.337∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.046) (0.059)
Obs. 529 529 1023
Industry dummies yes yes yes
McFadden R2 0.35 0.33 0.34
Interaction terms χ2 17.74
(P-Va l u e ) (0.17)
Non− nested test χ2 13.24 296.7
(P-Va l u e ) (0.42) (0.00)
Note: ***, **, * = denote signiﬁcance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. For the owernship
dummy the reference case is being an independent Thuringian ﬁrm. All report coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects.
Descriptions of sizes classes and industry dummies are given in the appendix.
12sample. After applying propensity score matching the diﬀerences vanish as the results in
Table 4 show. So, propensity score matching is a successful way to select or weight (de-
pending on the matching procedure) the comparison group in a way that matches similar
characteristics.8
Table 4: Mean comparison for treated and comparison group before and after matching




log(Size) 3.35 2.92∗∗∗ 3.29
t − stat. (4.52) (0.27)
log(1/Age) -2.22 -2.19 -2.23
t − stat. (-0.64) (-0.26)
log(1/Age)2 5.24 5.32 5.23
t − stat. (-0.42) (-0.04)
Human capital high 0.36 0.15∗∗∗ 0.36
t − stat. (14.38) (0.18)
Regional sales 13.08 26.38∗∗∗ 12.267
t − stat. (-6.35) (0.52)
West German sales 43.16 38.45∗∗ 40.80
t − stat. (2.18) (-0.45)
R&D department 0.72 0.16∗∗∗ 0.73
t − stat. (21.33) (-0.17)
Treated 283 224
Comparison 984 792
Note: ***, **, * = denote signiﬁcance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Statistical signiﬁcance
was tested in a two-tailed t-test between the supported ﬁrms and either ﬁrms from the total of controls or from
the propensity score based selected comparison group (t-values in brackets).
Results for the Kernel matching procedure on the private R&D outcome variables
(R&D intensity and patent activity) are shown in table 5. First, we look at the eﬀect for
the full sample of all ﬁrms. The results show a signiﬁcantly positive diﬀerence between
the R&D activity of treated and comparison ﬁrms. This is a ﬁrst important indication
that R&D subsidies do not fully lead to substitution eﬀects, but instead increase the
level of R&D intensity and of the probability for patent applications. Regarding the R&D
intensity, the results show that the average R&D activity of treated ﬁrms relative to the
comparison group is around 2.4 to 2.8 percentage points higher (depending on the chosen
bandwidth parameter of the Kernel function). Since the diﬀerence in the R&D intensity
is measured in terms of logarithms, the latter eﬀect can be calculated from ˆ θ in table 5
as follows: Taking the estimated coeﬃcient of 0.93 for all ﬁrms based on Kernel matching
8Since the deﬁnition of the treated and comparison group changes for diﬀerent outcome variables and matching designs,
we did run a speciﬁc test in each case. The results nevertheless hold uniformly. Detailed testing outputs can be obtained
from the authors upon request.
13with a bandwidth of 0.06, the diﬀerence between the treated and comparison group can
be calculated as 0.93∗exp(0.93) ≈ 2.4 percentage points. Alternatively to R&D intensity
as private sector outcome variable, we also use the binary dummy variable for patent
applications. The results in table 5 show for the sample of all ﬁrms that the probability
for a treated ﬁrm to apply for a patent is about 20 percentage points higher relative to
the comparison group.
Table 5: Kernel matching for private R&D activity
bandwidth = 0.06 bandwidth = 0.12
log(R&D intensity) Patent activity log(R&D intensity) Patent activity
All Firms
Treated = 207, Comparison = 745
ˆ θ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.048) (0.195) (0.047)
Medium (50 <s i z e≤ 250)
Treated = 66, Comparison = 160
ˆ θ 0.769∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗
(0.295) (0.091) (0.308) (0.094)
Small (20 <s i z e≤ 50)
Treated = 83, Comparison = 308
ˆ θ 1.043∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.069) (0.285) (0.071)
Micro (1 ≤ size ≤ 20)
Treated = 50, Comparison = 253
ˆ θ 1.696∗∗∗ 0.085 1.467∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.608) (0.102) (0.527) (0.099)
Note: ***, **, * = denote signiﬁcance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Bootstrapped standard
errors (in brackets) are calculated based on 500 repetitions.
We then estimate the causal impact of funding for three diﬀerent subgroups of SMEs.
Starting with medium sized ﬁrms, measured in terms of 51 to 250 employees, table 5
shows that the eﬀect on private R&D intensity is also signiﬁcantly positive, but smaller
compared to the average of all ﬁrms. We estimate a diﬀerence in the R&D intensity of
about 1.7 to 1.8 percentage points. The increase in the probability for patent application
is slightly bigger compared to the average of all ﬁrms (around 23 to 24 percentage points).
While the eﬀect for small ﬁrms with 11 up to 50 employees is found to be in line with
the average estimate for all ﬁrms (around 2.9 percentage points for R&D intensity, 24
percentage points for patent activity), the results for the subgroup of micro ﬁrms with
up to 10 employees are rather speciﬁc: Here we estimate a much higher increase in the
R&D intensity (more than 6 percentage points), while we do not observe any signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the patent activity relative to the comparison group of non-subsidized micro
ﬁrms.
14The latter insigniﬁcant result for very small ﬁrms may reﬂect diﬀerences in the innova-
tion strategies between small and large ﬁrms. Conte & Vivarelli (2005), for instance, ﬁnd
for Italian micro data between 1998 and 2000 that large ﬁrms heavily rely on own R&D
innovative eﬀort, while small ﬁrms more actively participate in cooperation agreements
and business groups including the acquisition of external technology in the process of
developing product and process innovations rather than choosing costly and time consu-
ming patent strategies. Ball & Kesan (2009) argue that due to high transaction costs of
litigation, small ﬁrms may not be able to eﬀectively monitor their patent rights and thus
consequently choose not to apply for patents at all. Both observations give a qualitative
argument, why input and output related R&D activity measures react diﬀerently to the
policy stimulus by ﬁrm size.9 One should thus be careful, in using the latter result as an
argument in favour for policy ineﬀectiveness of R&D subsidies. The strong increase in the
R&D intensity for micro ﬁrms rather hints at a large leverage eﬀect in terms of crowing-in
private R&D inputs by the grant schemes. This latter high outcome diﬀerence in turn is
likely to be driven by ﬁrms that start R&D activities for the ﬁrst time (induced by public
fundings), which is likely to be associated with a certain threshold eﬀect.
4 Robustness Checks
To check the sensitivity of the results with respect to the chosen matching routine, we use
a broad set of alternative weighting schemes for the matching procedure. The results for
R&D intensity are shown in table 6 and for patent activity in table 7. We apply stratiﬁ-
cation matching, k = 5 nearest-neighbor matching with an additional caliper restriction
in terms of one fourth of the standard error, as well as Mahalanobis metric distance mat-
ching. The latter algorithm allows including additional matching information besides the
propensity score (such as the 2-digit industry classiﬁcation and ﬁrm size categories). All
the procedures are again subject to the common support restriction.
Table 6 and Table 7 show that the results are very stable for diﬀerent weighting sche-
mes. With respect to R&D subsidies we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant result for combina-
tions of sample design and chosen matching routine. Depending on the weighting scheme,
the overall eﬀect for the sample of all ﬁrms varies from 2.4 to 5 percentage points (with
the highest eﬀect found by the 5-nearest neighbor routine). Moreover, as highlighted in
ﬁgure 1, all matching routines uniformly estimate the eﬀect for micro ﬁrms to be higher
compared to the samples of all, medium sized and small ﬁrms. For patent activity the
9Additionally, rather long time lags in the transmission from R&D inputs to R&D outputs have to be considered, which
are not captured by the sample data.
15estimated outcome diﬀerence for all ﬁrms varies between 20 and 27 percentage points and
is also highly signiﬁcant for all matching routines. Also, all algorithms report insigniﬁcant
results for the sample of micro ﬁrms.
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis for log(R&Di n t e n s i t y )
Dep. Var.: Stratiﬁcation 5-NN Caliper Mahalanobis
R&D intensity blocks =7 η =0 .25 × σPS PS, Industry PS, Ind, Size
All Firms
ˆ θ 1.173∗∗∗ 1.360∗∗∗ 1.222∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.198) (0.225) (0.218)
Medium (50 <s i z e≤ 250)
ˆ θ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.765∗ 0.974∗∗
(0.294) (0.266) (0.416) (0.392)
Small (10 <s i z e≤ 50)
ˆ θ 1.220∗∗∗ 1.305∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗
(0.380) (0.291) (0.350) (0.359)
Micro (1 ≤ size ≤ 10)
ˆ θ 1.192∗∗ 1.909∗∗∗ 1.434∗∗ 1.435∗∗
(0.582) (0.479) (0.618) (0.649)
Note: ***, **, * = denote signiﬁcance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. For the kernel matching
we use the Epanechnikow kernel as default. PS denotes Propensity Score. Standard errors in brackets.
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis for Patent activity
Dep. Var.: Stratiﬁcation 5-NN Caliper Mahalanobis
Patent activity blocks =7 η =0 .25 × σPS PS, Industry PS, Ind, Size
All Firms
ˆ θ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.061) (0.065)
Medium (50 <s i z e≤ 250)
ˆ θ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.082) (0.116) (0.113)
Small (10 <s i z e≤ 50)
ˆ θ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.068) (0.078) (0.087)
Micro (1 ≤ size ≤ 10)
ˆ θ 0.023 0.086 0.01 0.01
(0.107) (0.0083) (0.111) (0.111)
Note: ***, **, * = denote signiﬁcance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. For the kernel matching
we use the Epanechnikow kernel as default. PS denotes Propensity Score. Standard errors in brackets.
Since the econometric literature does not oﬀer clear cut guidance with respect to the
preferable matching estimator in empirical applications, we ﬁnally calculate a mean esti-
mator deﬁned as equally weighted average over all matching algorithms according to











Stratification Kernel 1 Kernel 2 Mahalanobis 1 Mahalanobis 2 Nearest Neighbor
All Firms 51 to 250 11 to 50 1 to 10
Note: For details see table 6.
ˆ θmean = 1
N
N
i=1 ˆ θi with i as number of matching estimators (in our case i =6 ) .T h e
results, together with their t-statistics, are reported in table 8. For the sample of all ﬁrms
we get a mean estimate for the R&D intensity of about 3.7 percentage points, which
comes pretty close to the ﬁndings in Almus & Czarnitzki (2003) as well as Czarnitzki &
Licht (2006), who ﬁnd an increase of roughly 4 percentage points for the R&D intensity
in East Germany between 1996–1998 and 1994–2000 respectively. The estimated mean
eﬀect for patent activity is 21.6 percentage points and also comes close to the marginal
eﬀect of 22% reported in Czarnitzki & Licht (2006). The mean eﬀect for micro ﬁrms is
with 7.4 percentage points the highest, for small ﬁrms with 11 up to 50 employees we
get an increase of 3.7 percentage points, for medium sized ﬁrms up to 250 employees a
moderate eﬀect of 2 percentage points. The eﬀect on patent activity varies between 21 and
28 percent for small, medium and all ﬁrms. Only for micro ﬁrms the eﬀect is estimated to
be statistically insigniﬁcant. The mean estimation results thus qualitatively support the
ﬁndings from the Kernel estimation shown above.
Using the estimated outcome eﬀect from table 8, we derive a rough proxy for the le-
verage eﬀect of the public funding on private sector R&D inputs. To do so, we take the
mean R&D intensity for non-subsidized ﬁrms as benchmark level and compute the lever-
age eﬀect as ratio of outcome eﬀect (net of public co-ﬁnancing) relative to the benchmark
level. Since we are lacking information on the absolute amounts of public expenditures,
17we assume by ’rule-of-thumb’ that the latter is about 50% of the outcome eﬀect. This
approximation is a very conservative estimate, since it assumes that there is a strict line-
ar relationship between private and public spendings in the determination of the ﬁrm’s
R&D intensity. That is, any second round eﬀects of public subsidies on private inputs
are ignored. For the full sample of all ﬁrms and small ﬁrms with size between 11 and 50
employes the results show that a doubling of public spendings also leads to a equipropor-
tional doubling in private inputs. The impact is the highest for micro ﬁrms, indicating
that a doubling of R&D subsidies, leads to a leverage eﬀect of 250%˙ Even if we reasonably
assume that the share of public spendings for this subgroup is actually higher, let’s say
a ’rule-of-thumb’ of 80% public co-ﬁnaning, this would still yield a leverage eﬀect for
private inputs of roughly 100%. The eﬀect is the smallest for medium-sized ﬁrms up to
250 employees. However, as pointed out, these results should only be interpreted carefully
as lower bounds of the actual leverage eﬀect.
Table 8: Mean estimates of policy eﬀect for private R&D activity (in percentage points)
R&D intensity Patent activity
All Firms 3.71∗∗∗ 21.26∗∗∗
t − stat. (5.59) (4.08)
Medium (50 <s i z e≤ 250) 2.03∗∗∗ 28.01∗∗∗
t − stat. (2.61) (2.91)
Small (10 <s i z e≤ 50) 3.72∗∗∗ 26.00∗∗∗
t − stat. (3.48) (3.48)
Micro (1 ≤ size ≤ 10) 7.40∗∗∗ 4.3
t − stat. (2.64) (0.42)
Note: ***, **, * = denote signiﬁcance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Coeﬃcients and t-values




i=1 ˆ θi with i as number of matching
estimators (in our case i = 6) and similar for the standard error.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we also restrict our sample only to those ﬁrms, who are
permanently performing R&D activity proxied by running an own R&D department.
The motivation for this restriction is simply to ’raise the bar’. That is, since ﬁrms with
permanent R&D activity should have an on average higher R&D intensity and probability
for patent application, this will lead to a tighter selection of the comparison group and thus
may shed additional light on the question of R&D policy eﬀectiveness. As Czartnitzki &
Licht (2006) argue, the latter setup is important since it compares treated and comparison
ﬁrms that are more equal in their structural characteristics, nevertheless it is also likely to
underestimate the eﬀect of R&D promotion, as it is implicitly assumed that the subsidy
alone is not able to motivate ﬁrms to start R&D activities.
Our results show that – both for R&D intensity as well as patent activity – we still
18estimate a signiﬁcant positive impact of R&D subsidies supporting the general eﬀectiven-
ess of the analyzed grant schemes for the case of East Germany. As expected, the eﬀect
for R&D intensity is smaller compared to the case of the unrestricted comparison group.
Whether this smaller increase may indicate a partial crowding-out of private spendings
or simply underestimates the total eﬀect, cannot be distinguished at this point. The esti-
mated eﬀect for the probability of patent applications is within the range of the outcome
diﬀerences found for the full sample of all ﬁrms. Since both treatment and comparison
group are rather small for permanently R&D active ﬁrms, a further disaggregation into
SME subaggregates is not feasible.
• Outcome diﬀerence for ﬁrms permanently performing R&D activity
1. R&D Intensity
– ˆ θmean =0 .644, SEˆ θmean =0 .258, t − value =2 .49
– Treated = 116, Comparison = 153
2. Patent Activity
– ˆ θmean =0 .190, SEˆ θmean =0 .067, t − value =2 .81
– Treated = 116, Comparison = 153
5 Conclusion
We have analysed the impact of public support schemes on private R&D activity for
a large cross-section of East German ﬁrms in 2003. Using diﬀerent matching routines to
identify the causal eﬀect of public funding, we estimate a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of public
support on private R&D activity. Our mean estimates show that subsidized ﬁrms have
on average about 3.7 percentage points higher R&D intensity than non-subsidized ﬁrms.
This result comes close to earlier ﬁndings reported in Almus & Czarnitzki (2003) as well as
Czarnitzki & Licht (2006), who ﬁnd a roughly 4 percentage point higher R&D intensity for
East German ﬁrms throughout the second half of the 1990s. Also, the estimated increase
of 22 percentage points in the probability for patent application is similar to the result
reported in Czarnitzki & Licht (2006).
While our results may thus be seen as a backup and robustness check for earlier empi-
rical evidence on East Germany based on a diﬀerent dataset, so far no empirical evidence
is reported with respect to the eﬀectiveness of R&D subsidies for small and medium-sized
ﬁrms. Here our study ﬁlls an important gap in the empirical literature. The focus on SMEs
is particularly relevant for East Germany, since its regional innovation system is largely
19driven by the latter group. Our results show, that the positive eﬀects found for the total
sample of ﬁrms also hold for three subgroups of SMEs (micro ﬁrms with 1 up to 10 ﬁrms,
small ﬁrms with 21 and up to 50 employees, as well as medium sized ﬁrms with 51 and
up to 250 employees). Regarding the R&D intensity as outcome variable, the biggest in-
crease is found for micro ﬁrms. Here the policy schemes seem to be particularly successful
in activating ﬁrms to start R&D activity for the ﬁrst time. For small and medium-sized
ﬁrms the eﬀect is also found to be positive but of smaller size.
With respect to patent activity, treated small and medium sized ﬁrms show a signiﬁ-
cant increase in the probability of patent application, while we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
eﬀect for micro ﬁrms. The latter insigniﬁcant result may reﬂect diﬀerences in the inno-
vation strategies between small and large ﬁrms, with very small ﬁrms choosing diﬀerent
innovation strategies rather than patenting (e.g. due to high transaction costs of litigation
small ﬁrms may not be able to eﬀectively monitor their patent rights and thus consequent-
ly choose not to apply for patents at all). It does not seem reasonable to take this result
as an indicator for policy ineﬀectiveness.
We have also investigated whether subsidies add to private R&D inputs, when only
those ﬁrms regularly performing R&D activity are analysed. Though the eﬀect is smaller
compared to the total sample of all ﬁrms, the signiﬁcant positive ﬁndings hold both for
the R&D intensity as well as patent activity. Finally, we aimed at proxying the leverage
eﬀect of public subsidies on private inputs. Using the mean of non-subsidized ﬁrms as a
benchmark level and a ’rule-of-thumb’ for public co-ﬁnancing, we get that a doubling of
public subsidizes also leads to an equiproportional increase in private R&D spendings. This
eﬀect is even higher for micro ﬁrms. Taken together, our results hint at the complementary
nature of public subsidies to private sector R&D activity in the East German regional
innovation system, which is mainly driven by innovative small and medium-sized ﬁrms.
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22A Testing for Sample Representativeness
Testing sample representativeness is an important pre-condition for empirical application.
We use both graphical and statistical approaches to check for the representativeness of
the GEFRA Business Survey. To start with, ﬁgure A.1 plots the proportion of ﬁrms for
the size classes ”up to 50 employees”, ”between 50 and 250 employees” as well as ”more
than 250 employees” in the GEFRA Business Survey as well as the total population of
ﬁrms in the Manufacturing Sector in Thuringia for the year 2003. As the ﬁgure shows,
though the response rate of small ﬁrms in the survey is somewhat smaller compared to
the actual population of ﬁrms in Thuringia and Germany, however the GEFRA Business
Survey still covers a very large number of ﬁrms with up to 50 employees. Additionally,
ﬁgure A.2 plots the proportion of ﬁrm for each 2-digit manufacturing subsector relative to
the total manufacturing sector for both the sample distribution and the total population
of all ﬁrms in Thuringia for the year 2003. As the ﬁgure shows the sample distribution
closely follows the pattern of the total population of Thuringian employees in descending
order of their relative importance.
Figure A.1: Proportions of Firms by Size Class
Source: Data from the German Statistical Oﬃce, GEFRA-Business Survey 2004.
Next to the above described descriptive statistics we also test for sample deviations
from the total population using a standard Z-statistic based test, which compares the
iFigure A.2: Proportions of ﬁrms per 2-digit Manufacturing subsectors
Source: Data from the German Statistical Oﬃce, GEFRA Business-Survey 2004.
Note: Based on 2-digit Manufacturing Sector data for the year 2003.
sample distribution relative to the overall distribution of the population. Since the total
population of Thuringian Manufacturing Sector ﬁrms in 2003 is known the proportion





where ρ is the sample population proportion, P is the population proportion and σρ
is the standard error of the proportion given by σρ =

P(1−P)
n ,w h e r en is the number
of observations in the respective (sub-)sample. We apply the test for for sample and
population proportions of each 2-digit industry. Table A.1 plots the respective sector
shares together with the standard error of the sample proportion and the corresponding Z-
statistic. As the results show, the Z-statistic indicates a statistically signiﬁcant deviation
of the sample distribution from the overall population only for one single sub-sector,
WZ28 ”Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment”
being overrepresented in the GEFRA Business-Survey. However, taken together the results
support the representativeness of our survey data.
iiTable A.1: Test for Sample Representativeness based on Manufacturing Sector Firm Data
WZ Code Pop. Share Pop. Sample Share Sample σs Z-Statistic
14 59 3,15% 10 0,76% 0,06 -0,43
15 213 11,38% 79 6,04% 0,04 -1,50
16 4 0,21% 2 0,15% 0,03 -0,02
17 51 2,73% 24 1,83% 0,03 -0,27
18 11 0,59% 6 0,46% 0,03 -0,04
19 14 0,75% 6 0,46% 0,04 -0,08
20 58 3,10% 65 4,97% 0,02 0,87
21 29 1,55% 22 1,68% 0,03 0,05
22 49 2,62% 60 4,58% 0,02 0,95
23 0 0,00% 0 0,00% 0,00 0,00
24 45 2,41% 38 2,90% 0,02 0,20
25 163 8,71% 123 9,40% 0,03 0,27
26 186 9,94% 111 8,48% 0,03 -0,51
27 28 1,50% 21 1,60% 0,03 0,04
28 314 16,78% 299 22,84% 0,02 2,80∗∗∗
29 208 11,12% 128 9,78% 0,03 -0,48
30 11 0,59% 6 0,46% 0,03 -0,04
31 96 5,13% 65 4,97% 0,03 -0,06
32 46 2,46% 40 3,06% 0,02 0,24
33 97 5,18% 97 7,41% 0,02 0,99
34 66 3,53% 37 2,83% 0,03 -0,23
35 9 0,48% 1 0,08% 0,07 -0,06
36 104 5,56% 57 4,35% 0,03 -0,40
37 10 0,53% 12 0,92% 0,02 0,18
Note: ***, **, * = denote signiﬁcance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The test is based on the
sectoral propotion of employees in the total population and sample proportion. For details about the applied
Z-statistic see text.
iiiB Supplementary Descriptive Statistics
Table A.2: Variable description for size classes and 2-digit industries
Variable Description
Sizes Classes
Size < 20 =1 if the ﬁrm has less than 20 employees; 0 otherwise
Size < 50 =1 if the ﬁrm has between 20 and 50 employees; 0 otherwise
Size < 100 =1 if the ﬁrm has between 50 and 100 employees; 0 otherwise
Size < 250 =1 if the ﬁrm has between 100 and 250 employees; 0 otherwise
Size > 250 =1 if the ﬁrm has 250 or more employees; 0 otherwise
2-digit Industry dummies
Ind15/16 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 15 and 16 according to the German
classiﬁcation of Economic Activities WZ2008 (Manufacture of food
products and beverages and tobacco products)
Ind17/19 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 17 to 19 Manufacture of textiles, of wearing
apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur; Tanning and dressing of leather;
manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear)
Ind20 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 20 (Manufacture of wood and of products of
wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and
plaiting materials)
Ind21/22 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 21 and 22 (Manufacture of pulp, paper and
paper products; Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded
media)
Ind24 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 24 (Manufacture of chemicals and chemical
products)
Ind25 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 25 (Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products)
Ind26 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 26 (Manufacture of other non-metallic
mineral products)
Ind27/28 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 27 and 28 (Manufacture of basic metals; of
fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment)
Ind29 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 29 (Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.)
Ind30/33 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 30 to 33 (Manufacture of oﬃce machinery
and computers; of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; of radio,
television and communication equipment and apparatus; and of
medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks)
Ind34/35 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 34 and 35 (Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers and semi-trailers; of other transport equipment)
Ind36/37 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 36 and 37 (Manufacture of furniture;
manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling)
Ind72/74 =1 if ﬁrm belongs to industry 72 to 74 (Computer and related activities;
Research and development; Other business activities)
ivFigure A.3: Distribution of treated and comparison ﬁrms by industry
Note: For the deﬁnition of diﬀerent industry dummies used see table 2.
Figure A.4: Distribution of treated and comparison ﬁrms by size class
Note: For the deﬁnition of diﬀerent size classes used see text.
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